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Abstract 
Whereas McGovern (2014) calls for a moratorium on the ever increasing (ab)use of the word 
‘contradiction’, principally because scholars of work and employment fail to connect 
different levels of analysis and/or demonstrate how and why contradiction(s) lead to 
widespread instability and upheaval, it can be demonstrated how both can be achieved 
through the ‘system, society, dominance’ framework proposed by Smith and Meiksins 
(1995). In what follows, the empirical focus is on the safety-critical work of airport ground 
service providers (GSPs), where key elements of the employment relationship embody 
contradictions that can be traced to the (sub-)system (mode of production) of a Single 
European Aviation Market (SEAM) that is now dominated by low fares airlines (LFAs). 
Instead of a moratorium, scholars of work and employment need to reconnect with society 
and theoretically ground their analysis in a (capitalist) system beset with contradictions 
between the forces and relations of production. 
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Introduction 
If students of work and employment ignore society, then a case can be made for a 
moratorium on the word ‘contradiction’, an analytical term for tensions within the 
employment relationship of capitalist firms and in relation to the control of labour 
(McGovern, 2014: 24). To be sure, all capitalist societies are characterised by a contradiction 
between the forces and relations of production, but scholars should not simply ‘read 
[contradiction] into the evidence’ at the workplace level (ibid: 30). Instead, it is necessary to 
demonstrate how contradictions operating at the level of the mode of production are manifest 
at more concrete levels of empirical inquiry. Thus, the test is not simply whether there are 
competing demands on workers (e.g. cost vs. quality, management vs. consumers, agency vs. 
client) but whether a ‘fundamental weakness’ or ‘fatal flaw’ is built into the very fabric of the 
(employment) relationship (Edwards, 2014: 9). This is not to call for a (futile) search for the 
contradictions of capitalism that ‘sow the seeds of its own destruction’. After all, capitalism 
has proven to be an incredibly resilient mode of production that can accommodate myriad 
tensions and conflicts of interest between different social actors. This contribution to the 
debate echoes the call for a model that embodies common capitalist principles (‘system 
effects’) with particular ‘societal effects’ and ‘dominance effects’, where the latter are driven 
increasingly by trans-national corporations (TNCs) (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; and Edwards, 
2014: 16-17). 
 
Over time, the ‘system’ (capitalist mode of production) has taken different 
(predominant) forms. The system that preoccupied Braverman (1974) was ‘monopoly 
capitalism’ whereas today there is much greater focus on the contradictions of ‘consumer 
capitalism’ or the neo-liberal brand of ‘free market capitalism’ that is driving globalization. 
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Systemic contradictions are variously magnified, or mitigated, by different social institutions 
(‘societal effects’), while ‘dominance effects’ may override or combine with societal effects 
to reshape institutions. Dominance effects, in turn, are conditioned by the system, ‘by the 
tendency for ongoing re-alignment of economic powers within global capitalism’ (Smith and 
Meiksins, 1995: 261). Thus, instead of a moratorium, it is possible to conceptualise how 
contradictions ‘play out’ from the (abstract) level of a mode of production to the (concrete) 
level of a particular organization or workplace (Edwards et al, 2013). As different industrial 
sectors can be considered distinct economic ‘sub-systems’, with their own identities, histories 
and interests (Smith and Meiksins, 1995: 253; and Russell et al, 2017), the contradictions of 
capitalism are most readily identified and empirically analysed at this intermediate level of 
inquiry (i.e. between the workplace and society/global economy). 
 
When the contradictions of capitalism play out in a safety-critical work environment, 
careful attention must be paid to what might (literally) be a ‘fatal flaw’ in the system. 
Contrast the potential consequences of airline cabin crew failing to smile at customers with 
ground service providers (GSPs) who might load insufficient or contaminated fuel, fail to 
properly de-ice the aircraft prior to take-off, dispatch a flight with a passenger’s luggage 
when the passenger fails to board, ignore damage to packages of dangerous goods, or allow 
passengers to walk across the ramp unsupervised.1 The work of airport GSPs has been 
identified as one of the ‘Significant Seven’ areas of risk in the UK Civil Aviation Authority’s 
(CAA) Safety Plan, not least because only 50 per cent of ground-handling related errors are 
currently reported to the CAA through the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) scheme 
introduced in 2007.2 Reporting of safety incidents varies from one EU Member State to the 
next and there have been (unsuccessful) attempts to mitigate these societal effects through an 
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EU Directive (2003/42/EC) on occurrence reporting in civil aviation and a Regulation (EU 
376/2014) to promote a ‘just safety culture’.3  
 
The root problem, as demonstrated in the following section, is not societal but 
systemic, and the ‘solution’ is certainly not organizational (e.g. a requirement under Article 
16-11 of Regulation 376/2014 for every GSP to adopt internal rules describing how ‘just 
culture’ principles are ‘guaranteed and implemented within that organization’). At the 
organizational level, where contradictions are most readily observed, the evidence presented 
in a subsequent section, based on two major studies of recent developments in the European 
civil aviation section (Harvey and Turnbull, 2012 and 2014),4 indicates that most GSPs are 
‘just about’ safe. Of greatest concern is that instead of routine reporting of safety incidents, 
near misses or other safety issues, the system means that ‘silence is the safest bet’ for workers 
more concerned about their own (precarious) employment than the reporting requirements of 
national law or EU Regulations. For too many GSP workers, silence is not so much a 
conscious decision to withhold voice as a fundamental inability to raise safety concerns 
because they have ‘just no voice’.  
 
For McGovern (2014: 33), ‘nothing is so damaging to those who insist on the 
significance of contradictions than the massively awkward fact that they have not generated 
the kind of workplace instability and change that the concept originally implied’. If instability 
is taken as resistance and strikes there is extensive evidence of conflict from primary (hub) 
airports across Europe where trade unions are well-organised and workers have a confident 
voice. Alternatively, if instability is taken as constant reorganization of contracts and control, 
and a system that is ‘just about safe’, then one might consider the many secondary airports 
where the new generation of low fares airlines (LFAs) have opened (and closed) routes at an 
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alarming rate in recent years but where overt resistance or even ‘voicing concerns’ is more 
notable by its absence.  
 
‘It’s capitalism, stupid’ – contradictions of the aviation sub-system 
Civil aviation in Europe has been transformed by the creation of a Single European Aviation 
Market (SEAM), consolidated by the mid-1990s through a series of ‘market-opening’ 
reforms (Dobson, 2010). Whereas competition was previously restricted to ‘legacy’ (national 
flag) airlines, with routes between airport pairs populated by the respective national airlines 
under bilateral air service agreements (BASAs) negotiated by sovereign states, there is now 
an ‘open market’ system that has paved the way for LFAs to dominate the intra-European 
market (Harvey and Turnbull, 2014).  
 
LFAs compete on the basis of high utilization of their capital assets (aircraft), which 
depends critically on rapid airport turnaround – typically around 25 minutes – as aircraft 
accumulate cost and earn no revenue when on the ground. LFAs minimise costs by sub-
contracting all ancillary services (e.g. airport check-in, gate services, baggage handling, 
fuelling) and even ‘core activities’ such as flight and cabin crew are managed via commercial 
contracts rather than employment contracts in the ‘ultra-low-cost airlines’ (e.g. over 70 per 
cent of Ryanair pilots are ‘self-employed’) (Harvey and Turnbull, 2015). Although most 
LFAs fly mainly to secondary airports, providing an alternative route for passengers rather 
than direct competition with the legacy airlines that fly to primary (hub) airports, the latter 
have been sucked into the cost-cutting vortex created by the former. Herein lies the root of 
restructuring and conflict between management and labour at legacy airlines in recent years 
(Harvey and Turnbull, 2014; Taylor and Moore, 2015). 
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Once the SEAM had been established, attention turned to airports and ground-
handling services, with a new Directive (96/67/EC) that ‘enforced competition’ (a minimum 
of two service providers) at all European airports with at least 2 million passengers or 50,000 
tonnes of cargo per annum. ‘Prior to this, monopolies were the norm for ground-handling 
services at EU airports and many airlines complained about high prices and poor-quality 
services’.5 Between 1996 and 2007, the number of GSPs in Europe increased by almost 100 
per cent for baggage handling (Booz & Co., 2009). In contract negotiations between airlines 
and GSPs, the former hold far more cards than the latter, especially LFAs who contract with 
GSPs at secondary airports (Malighetti et al, 2016: 234). Almost three-quarters of all routes 
in Europe are ‘single-carrier’, largely because of LFAs offering alternative routes to 
secondary airports, and it is much easier to open, and close, a point-to-point route compared 
to primary (base/hub) airport services.6 In fact, while approximately 2,000 new routes are 
now opened every year in Europe, around 15-20 per cent of all routes are closed each year 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2012: 4). Ryanair, the world’s most profitable airline, is also the 
most ‘foot-loose’, being responsible for the highest number of airport downsizing and base 
abandonments in the world (Malighetti et al, 2016: 240). At all European airports, there is 
now a higher proportion of ‘foot-loose’ routes under the new system of open competition 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2012: 25). 
 
These developments reflect a critical shift in the sub-system of European civil 
aviation from ‘structural regulation’ (under BASAs) to ‘conduct regulation’ (under the 
SEAM). The former concerns the way the market is organized, such as rules on market entry, 
single capacity rules and the like (basically, which firms are allowed to engage in particular 
activities). The latter concerns behaviour in the market, such as measures to guard against 
anti-competitive behaviour, price controls, rules against certain forms of advertising and 
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other restrictions on competitive activity (basically, how firms behave in their chosen 
activities). Ex ante regulation is often more effective than ex post regulation, especially where 
anti-competitive forms of behaviour are difficult to define, let alone enforce. In particular, 
‘social dumping’ – the lowering of wage or social standards by organizations ‘for the sake of 
enhanced competitiveness … indirectly involving their employees and/or home or host 
country governments’ (Bernaciak, 2012) – often goes ‘undetected’, or more precisely is now 
built into the very fabric of the system and is ‘permitted’, if not facilitated, in some Member 
States (i.e. systemic contradictions are magnified by societal effects). Cost is the determining 
factor when dominant airlines, especially LFAs, tender for ground-handling services at 
secondary airports, and they will accept quotes from GSPs ‘even if they know that you 
cannot make it at that [low] price’ (GSP manager quoted by Rubery et al, 2003: 276). As 
labour is the single largest and most pliable cost for any GSP, accounting for as much as 80 
per cent of total operating costs, any initiatives to satisfy the contractual requirements 
imposed by the client, whether LFA or legacy airline, invariably focus on labour. Thus, it is 
the intensified and highly cost-competitive system of ‘free market capitalism’ that is driving 
the increasing rate of exploitation of GSP workers. To rephrase McGovern (2014: 33), the 
‘massively awkward outcome’ for these workers is instability and change, manifest in the 
constant demand for higher productivity and rapid aircraft turnaround that compromises the 
safety of ground-handling services. 
 
‘Just about safe’  
In any triangular relationship – whether management-worker-customer (front-stage service 
work) or management-worker-client (back-stage service work) – there will be competing 
demands on workers. These demands create tensions that are accommodated in different 
ways by the parties to the employment relationship. For example, in many front-line service 
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jobs, ‘the worker is employed to meet the goals specified by management and satisfying the 
customer is a means to this end’ (Bélanger and Edwards, 2013: 436). In contrast, in many 
back-stage jobs, including GSPs, safety rather than customer service is the critical outcome of 
the service interaction. Triangular relationships colour, and often cloud, the competing 
demands on workers, but they cannot condone the actions of management. Put differently, 
management should not be let off the culpability hook (Brook, 2007: 370). This is not to 
gainsay that some firms lose at the expense of others, rather to emphasise that capitalist firms, 
especially the dominant TNCs, are the architects and beneficiaries of changes to the system 
(mode of production) (ibid: 372). 
 
While competing demands on the worker, and their temporary resolution, are not, 
ipso facto, evidence of contradictions in work and employment – it is ‘not the immediate 
nature of the job but rather the economic and social relations in which it is located, that is 
critical’ (Bélanger and Edwards, 2013: 447) – there will always be key elements of any 
employment relationship that open an analytical window to fundamental weaknesses and 
fatal flaws in the (sub-)system. In civil aviation, three elements of the employment 
relationship, namely training, the nature of work (specifically work intensity and job 
insecurity), and employee involvement and participation, are identified as ‘safety-critical’ by 
leading national and international organizations such as the CAA7 and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO).8 Contradictions in the mode of production are manifest, and 
more readily analysed, through a focus on these safety-critical elements. 
 
Training is perhaps the element most intuitively, and indeed most evidently required 
to ensure (procedural) safety. If nothing else, training is necessary to raise workers’ 
awareness of potential hazards, how to deal with those hazards, and most importantly how to 
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respond in emergency situations. However, training standards vary from one society to the 
next, there is no legal minimum threshold for training in the Directive (96/67/EC) that opened 
the European ground handling market to competition (it is conduct, not structure, that is 
regulated), and training is a ‘soft target’ when GSPs come under pressure to cut costs. This 
fundamental flaw in the system is readily acknowledged: ‘One of the most effective solutions 
to reduce the risk of the human factor in safety is training. Although this is widely accepted, 
it is also true that when cost reductions must be made, the first thing to be reduced is often 
the training budget’.9 Data from two large-scale studies of the European civil aviation 
industry (see endnote 4) support this observation, indicating that both the duration and 
content of GSP staff training has been diminished and diluted as a result of cost-competition. 
In one case, for example, with contracts under threat, the time spent training for GSP recruits 
was reduced from 2 weeks to just 1 week, with ‘classroom teaching’ replacing the previous 
system of ‘shadowing’ (on-the-job training). Airport security rules were also broken when 
new recruits were issued a visitor’s pass to enable them to work airside prior to being 
certified (fully trained). 
 
Under-investment in human capital, and the consequent (in)ability of GSP workers to 
fully comply with prescribed safety procedures, is compounded by work intensification. 
Working harder and faster erodes the ability of workers to follow safety procedures in the 
time available for aircraft turnaround. In the words of one ground handler, ‘dodging the rules 
in order to get the turnaround’. Time constraints on the ground cannot be under-estimated – 
the cost per minute of any delay, based on an A320 aircraft, is over €80 (Cook and Tanner 
2010), which is more than the average ticket price per passenger on LFAs. GSP workers are 
acutely aware of the consequences of delay for themselves (ranging from reprimand and 
financial penalties to dismissal) and their clients (financial losses on the flight in question and 
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possible route closure or even airport abandonment). During focus group discussions, GSP 
workers articulated not only their reluctance to report immediate safety concerns (e.g. near 
misses) but also to engage in the more time-consuming process of resolving underlying safety 
risks. Thus, instead of contradiction being ‘read into’ the data, it emerged directly from the 
views expressed by employees (cf. McGovern, 2014: 30). 
 
Servicing more aircraft within a very short time window, often with fewer workers, is 
a recipe for risk. Flight dispatchers face the daily challenge of allocating limited human 
resources to aircraft at different airport gates, often some distance apart. It is the 
responsibility of the dispatcher to confirm that everything is in order before flights depart, but 
with more flights and more passengers on-board LFAs, one outcome of being ‘in a hurry [is] 
you forget things. You can’t afford to make mistakes, but you do!’ This is not to suggest that 
safety and security are not paramount in the minds of GSP workers, rather to highlight the 
primacy of punctuality. As one GSP worker remarked, ‘Security is important, but punctuality 
is most important. Punctuality is money’. During one focus group discussion, another GSP 
worker answered his own (rhetorical) question on this potentially fatal flaw in the current 
system: ‘Safety first? What a joke!’  
 
Work intensification combined with precarious employment contracts is no laughing 
matter. Research has shown that workers’ perception of job (in)security is correlated with a 
reluctance to comply with safety protocols (Probst and Brubaker, 2001) and report accidents 
(Probst et al., 2013). Work in many areas of civil aviation is increasingly insecure and 
precarious (Bamber et al., 2009), which tends to focus workers’ attention on those factors 
most likely to enhance their prospects of job retention, such as turn-around time, rather than 
safety (cf. Probst, 2004). Short-term contracts are common to cover peak periods of demand 
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(e.g. winter ski season and summer holiday periods), but new forms of temporal flexibility 
have been introduced such as ‘split-shifts’ whereby the working day is divided between 
morning and evening peak periods when most aircraft depart and then return. At one airport, 
a shop steward noted that it was not uncommon to find temporary workers sleeping in their 
vehicles in the airport car park between (split) shifts, rather than travelling home to 
recuperate, because of the limited ‘turnaround time’ between morning and evening shifts. 
Another feature of precarious contracts is a higher hourly rate of pay in exchange for sickness 
benefits, leading to reluctance on the part of GSP staff to report in sick when genuinely ill.  
 
Insecure workers often fail to engage with health and safety initiatives because they 
feel that their views are marginalised (Aronsson, 1999). Employee involvement and 
participation play a critical role in raising workers’ awareness of, and their ability and 
willingness to follow safety procedures. Consultation and communication is in fact the 
fulcrum of the ‘just safety culture’ recently embraced by the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) and the European civil aviation social partners.10  
 
Essentially, a just safety culture proceeds from the supposition that whereas human 
factors play a major role in accidents, a very small proportion of human actions that lead to 
accidents are deliberate. Most are not the result of recklessness or sabotage and so do not 
warrant sanction. This does not mean that workers who engage in recklessness or sabotage 
should be immune from punishment, but that a just safety culture ensures genuine mistakes 
are identified so that processes and consequently safety might be continuously improved. 
Thus, a just safety culture is predicated on ‘an organisational climate in which people are 
prepared to report their errors and near misses’ (ESARR, 2006: 10). However, instead of a 
culture of voice, many GSPs have created a ‘culture of silence’ (Barry and Wilkinson, 2016: 
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263) through a combination of fear (managers ‘shoot the messenger’), futility (concerns will 
fall on management ‘deaf ears’) and fundamental mistrust (managers ‘put the blame on 
workers, not the system’). When asked if they ‘feel comfortable reporting safety concerns to 
management’, less than half (42 per cent) of the GSP respondents agreed with this statement 
while more than one-in-four disagreed.11 Direct (downward) communication between 
management and staff happened ‘not very often’ in the experience of most GSP workers (52 
per cent), while a further 12 per cent claimed this ‘never happens’. Managements’ reluctance 
to engage with trade unions12 in the civil aviation sector is further evidence of how workers 
can be ‘organized out’ of the voice process (Donaghey et al, 2011). Despite the frequent 
juxtaposition of ‘contradiction and conflict’, or more accurately the conflation of one with the 
other (McGoven, 2014: 29), structured antagonism in the employment relationship does not 
always lead to overt resistance on the part of workers (Edwards 2014). 
 
‘Just no voice’ 
Although union density levels in civil aviation vary from one EU Member State to the next, 
overall density levels are relatively high compared to other industrial sectors in the same 
society. Domain membership – the ratio of total membership to potential membership, as 
demarcated by the membership domain – tends to be lower in ground handling compared to 
other domains (e.g. flight crew) (Eurofound, 2010: 11-24). At primary airports where ground 
handling was traditionally a monopoly (airport authority) or duopoly (airport and the 
dominant airline) there is still a legacy of strong trade union organization. Ground staff at 
these airports identify themselves as safety professionals and have resisted the increasing rate 
of exploitation built into the new system (mode of production) created by the SEAM. Put 
differently, workers are not passive victims of liberalization and intensified competition, but 
social actors who, through mobilization, can mitigate some of the worst effects of the 
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contradictions that impact on the employment relationship. This is especially the case where 
societal effects curb some of the worst excesses (dominance effects) of LFAs and the 
demands they place on GSPs. Recent disputes include strikes in protest against work 
intensification and its impact on safety at Berlin airports (March 2017) and against ‘lack of 
respect, bad management and under-staffing’ at Brussels airport (November 2016). As the 
European organization of the Airports Council International (ACI) recently highlighted, ‘In a 
liberalised ground handling market, working conditions and the social protection of staff are 
at the core of many conflicts’ (ACI-Europe, 2011: 4). That said, industrial action to defend 
existing conditions from any further erosion is indicative of a ‘just defence’ tactic rather than 
contributing to a proactive ‘just safety’ strategy. 
 
At secondary airports, especially those only recently brought into service by the 
growth of LFAs, union organization is often weak or non-existent, especially at the sub-
subcontractors who are subject to even greater pressure to reduce costs and increase work 
intensity (ACI-Europe, 2011: 4). GSP workers on precarious contracts are acutely aware of 
how the system works – if LFAs cannot achieve high utilization (rapid turnaround) and make 
a profit, they will readily close the route or even abandon the airport altogether. As GSP work 
is safety critical, individual forms of resistance such as sabotage or ca’canny – the ‘slowing 
down of work and a deterioration of quality’, or ‘poor work for poor pay’ (Dubois, 1976: 45) 
– is rarely countenanced. As for collective action, even if they had the associational resources 
to organize a strike, such resistance would more likely hasten the transfer of service contracts 
to rival GSPs and/or result in route closures or airport abandonment.13 Where there is no 
challenge to management, either because workers are complicit in unsafe practices or unions 
are not present or fail to raise safety concerns, then unsafe working practices are ‘allowed’ 
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(Carter and Kline, 2017: 233) by a toxic interaction of system, society and dominance effects. 
The outcome is just silence rather than just safety. 
 
Conclusion – the (flight) path to contradiction 
Calling for a moratorium on the term ‘contradiction’ at a time of crisis for capitalism might 
seem perverse, but scholars of work and employment are often all too quick to equate 
‘conflict’ with ‘contradiction’. To be sure, conflict at work is often the most direct route to 
identifying how contradictions in the mode of production ‘play out’ in the employment 
relationship, but one should not expect contradiction to emerge ‘directly from the views 
expressed by employees’ as McGovern (2014: 30) suggests. Contradiction leads to ‘the 
expectation of widespread instability and upheaval within capitalist workplaces’ (ibid: 33), 
but it can also silence the workforce through a combination of dominance effects and societal 
forces that suffocate, rather than support, employee voice. Consequently, when entering what 
Marx called the ‘hidden abode’ of production, there is a need to focus on the critical elements 
of the labour process and the employment relationship that might expose any ‘fundamental 
flaw’ or ‘fatal weakness’ in the (sub-)system. 
 
This task is arguably more straightforward in the case of safety-critical service work 
where dominant firms (LFAs) have imposed new contractual terms on GSPs and their 
workers that intensifies the rate of exploitation. The fundamental weakness of the SEAM is 
clearly not ‘fatal’ if measured by accidents and deaths – civil aviation is in fact the safest 
mode of transport on this metric – but the (sub-)system privileges cost and celerity over a just 
safety culture and GSP workers must deal with this contradiction on a daily basis. The 
fundamental weaknesses of other labour processes may be rather opaque, but the search for 
contradiction has served social scientists rather well. The forces and relations of production 
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of every sub-sector are embedded in concrete social formations with specific, often unique, 
histories, institutional rules, labour organizations and the like (Russell et al, 2017: 430). As 
such, they are no less amenable to empirical research informed by a focus on dominance 
effects (the most accessible and tractable level of empirical inquiry), societal effects (the 
fundamental maxim of industrial sociology that in order to understand what happens inside 
the factory gate, behind the office door or on the airport ramp researchers must also look 
outside), and the more abstract level of the capitalist (sub-)system. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank Paul Edwards, the anonymous referees and the editor for 
their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article. The European Commission 
provided funding for the research via the European Sector Social Dialogue Committee for 
Civil Aviation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 16 
References 
 
ACI-Europe (2011) Position on Requirements for a Performing Ground Handling Market. 
Brussels: ACI. 
 
Aronsson G (1999) Contingent workers and health and safety. Work Employment and Society 
13(3): 439–59. 
 
Bamber GJ, Gittell JH, Kochan, TA and Von Nordenflycht A (2009) Up in the Air: How 
Airlines Can Improve Performance by Engaging their Employees. Ithaca: ILR Press.  
 
Barry M and Wilkinson A (2016) Pro-social or pro-management? A critique of the 
conception of employee voice as a pro-social behaviour within organizational behaviour. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 54(2) 261–84. 
 
Bélanger J and Edwards P (2013) The nature of front-line service work: distinctive features 
and continuity in the employment relationship. Work, Employment and Society 27(3): 433–
50. 
 
Bernaciak M (2012) Social dumping: political catchphrase or threat to labour standards? 
Working Paper 2012.06, Brussels: European Trade Union Institute. 
 
Booz & Co (2009) Effects of EU Liberalisation on Air Transport Employment and Working 
Conditions, DG-TREN. 
 17 
Braverman H (1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century. London: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Brook P (2007) Customer oriented militants? A critique of the ‘customer oriented 
bureaucracy’ theory on front-line service worker collectivism. Work, Employment and 
Society 21(2): 363–74. 
 
Carter B and Kline R (2017) The crisis of public sector trade unionism: evidence from the 
Mid Staffordshire hospital crisis. Capital & Class 41(2): 217–37. 
 
Cook A and Tanner G (2010) European Airline Delay Cost Reference Values. Brussels: 
EUROCONTROL Performance Review Unit. 
 
Copenhagen Economics (2012) Airport Competition in Europe. Copenhagen: Copenhagen 
Economics. 
 
Dobson A (2010) Civil aviation and European integration: creating the seemingly impossible 
SEAM. Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4): 1127–47. 
 
Donaghey J, Cullinane N, Dundon T, and Wilkinson A (2011) Reconceptualising employee 
silence: problems and prognosis. Work, Employment and Society 25(1): 51–67. 
 
Dubois P (1979) Sabotage in Industry. Harmondsworth: Pelican. 
 
 18 
Edwards P (2014) Were the 40 years of ‘radical pluralism’ a waste of time? A response to 
Peter Ackers and Patrick McGovern. University of Warwick: Warwick Papers in Industrial 
Relations, No.99. 
 
Edwards PK, Tregaskis O, Sanchez R, Lévesque C, McDonnell A and Quintanilla J (2013) 
Human resource management practices in the multinational company: a test of system, 
societal and dominance effects. Industrial & Labor Relations Review 66(3): 588–615. 
  
ESARR (2006) Establishment of ‘Just Culture’ Principles in ATM Safety Data Reporting and 
Assessment. Brussels: European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. 
 
Eurofound (2010) Representativeness of the European Social Partner Organisations: Civil 
Aviation. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions. 
 
Harvey G, Turnbull P (2015) Can labor arrest the “sky pirates”? Transnational trade 
unionism in the European civil aviation industry. Labor History 56(3): 308–26. 
 
Harvey G and Turnbull P (2014) Evolution of the Labour Market in the Airline Industry due 
to the Development of the Low Fares Airlines (LFAs). Brussels: European Transport 
Workers’ Federation. 
 
Harvey G and Turnbull P (2012) The Development of the Low-Cost Model in the European 
Civil Aviation Industry. Brussels: European Transport Workers’ Federation. 
 
 19 
Malighetti P, Paleari S and Redoni R (2016) Base abandonments by low-cost carriers. 
Journal of Air Transport Management 55(August): 234–44. 
 
McGovern P (2014) Contradictions at work: a critical review. Sociology 48(1): 20–37. 
 
Probst TM (2004) Safety and insecurity: exploring the moderating effect of organizational 
safety climate. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 9(1): 3–10. 
 
Probst TM and Brubaker TL (2001) The effects of job insecurity on employee safety 
outcomes: cross-sectional and longitudinal explorations. Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology 6(2): 139–59. 
 
Probst TM, Barbaranelli C and Petitta L (2013) The relationship between job insecurity and 
accident under-reporting: a test in two countries. Work & Stress 27(4): 383–402.  
 
Rubery J, Cooke FL, Earnshaw J and Marchington M (2003) Inter-organizational relations 
and employment in a multi-employer environment. British Journal of Industrial Relations 
41(2): 265–89. 
 
Russell B, Smith C, Valsecchi R and Andersson Bäck M (2017) System, society and 
dominance effects in the adoption of tele-health: a tri-country comparison. Economic and 
Industrial Democracy 38(3): 425–47. 
 
Smith C and Meiksins P (1995) System, society and dominance effects in cross-national 
organisational analysis. Work, Employment and Society 9(2): 241–67. 
 20 
 
Taylor P and Moore S (2015) Cabin crew collectivism: labour process and the roots of  
mobilization. Work, Employment and Society 29(1): 79–98. 
 
Author biographies 
Geraint Harvey is a Senior Lecturer in Industrial Relations and HRM at Birmingham 
Business School. His wide-ranging research interests include the importance of the employee 
relations context to systems of high performance and employee voice in business ethics and 
corporate social responsibility to bogus self-employment and new forms of work. He 
has published research in a range of academic and practitioner journals and is the author of 
Management in the Airline Industry (Routledge). 
 
Peter Turnbull is Professor of Management and Industrial Relations at the School of 
Economics, Finance & Management, University of Bristol. He was previously an Academic 
Fellow at the International Labour Organization (ILO) and has produced several reports for 
the ILO, European Commission, International Transport Workers’ Federation, European 
Transport Workers’ Federation and the European Cockpit Association. His current research 
focuses on new business strategies, atypical forms of employment, and ‘social dumping’ in 
the European transport sector. 
 
Daniel Wintersberger is a Teaching Fellow at Birmingham Business School, University of 
Birmingham. His main research interests are in comparative employment relations in the 
global political economy, different types of union and non-union forms of employee voice 
and employee experiences of high performance work systems in civil aviation and safety 
critical service work more generally. He is the editor of International Human Resource 
 21 
Management: A Case Study Approach (Kogan Page) and is currently editing a book on 
employment relations in the global civil aviation industry. 
                                                     
1 The Aviation Herald (www.avherald.com) reports daily on incidents such as these. 
2 https://www.caa.co.uk/Safety-initiatives-and-resources/Safety-projects/GHOST/Human-
Factors-Subgroup/  
3 According to Article 2 (12) of the Regulation: ‘“just culture” means a culture in which 
front-line operators or other persons are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions 
taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but in which gross 
negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.’ 
4 These studies involved case studies of LFAs and GSPs, a survey of civil aviation workers, 
focus group discussion and one-to-one (semi-structured) interviews with managers and union 
representatives. All examples of and quotations from GSP workers are taken from the 
fieldwork for these two projects unless otherwise referenced. 
5 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/airports/ground_handling_market_en  
6 Around 40 per cent of intra-EU scheduled capacity in 2011 was point-to-point. At smaller 
airports with less than 10 million passengers per annum, point-to-point (P2P) services 
accounted for almost 60 per cent of all traffic in 2011 (compared to just over 40 per cent in 
2002). At larger airports with 10 to 25 million passengers the P2P share is less than 26 per 
cent, at airports with more than 25 million passengers the P2P share is less than 14 per cent 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2012: 28). 
7http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%201209%20HF%20Action%20Plan%20V3%201
%20Jan2016.pdf  
8https://www.icao.int/safety/scan/Documents/GLOBAL%20SAFETY%20AVIATION%20P
LAN%202013.pdf  
9 International Air Transport Association (IATA) spokesperson responsible for ground 
handling, http://www.internationalairportreview.com/advent-calendar/7-december-2014/  
10 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/2015-10-01-just-culture-declaration_en . See 
also endnote 3. 
11 The study included a large-scale survey of civil aviation workers that generated over 2,700 
responses (see endnote 4). The data presented here is based on the responses of 228 GSP 
workers within this larger sample. 
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12 When asked if management communicated with workers via a trade union, 60 per cent 
selected ‘not very often’ and a further 15 per cent opted for ‘never’. 
13 Ryanair’s recent decision to abandon its plans for a base in Copenhagen following 
industrial action by GSPs is a case in point. 
